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Material Distortion of Income:
A New Approach?
S. Rex Lewis, 65 T.C. 625 (1975).
Jackson B. Howard, P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 76,005 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the dispute over the proper timing of prepaid
interest deductions by a cash basis taxpayer has been one of abrupt
changes of position by the courts and the Internal Revenue Service
("Service"). The United States Tax Court's recent decisions in S.
Rex Lewis' and Lewis's twin case Jackson B. Howard2 continue
this practice by taking an approach different from what was felt 3 to
be an essentially correct position set out in Revenue Ruling 68-
643.4 Lewis and Howard establish as the prepaid interest deduc-
tion standard a deposit distortion test, thus marking a change from
the approach used in previous prepaid interest case law.
The purpose of this note is threefold: 1) to give a brief history
of the law in the prepaid interest area; 2) to discuss the facts and
the court's analysis in S. Rex Lewis; and 3) to discuss the effect the
case will have on prepaid interest deductions.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF PREPAID
INTEREST DEDUCTIONS
The starting point for the dispute over the cash basis taxpayer's
timing of his interest deduction is section 163 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 ("Code") and the substantially identical
provisions of the 1939 Code.5 Section 163(a) straightforwardly
1. 65 T.C. 625 (1975).
2. P-H TAX CT. MEm. 1 76,005 (1976). Howard involved Mr. Lewis's law
partner and fellow real estate investor. Since the facts are the same
for both cases, and since Howard was resolved in accordance with the
opinion rendered in Lewis, this note will discuss only the Lewis case.
However, a reference to the Lewis case is also a reference to the
Howard case in most circumstances.
3. Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 36 (1968).
4. Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cum. BuLr. 76.
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 23 (b).
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states: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."6 The Code does
not provide a definition of interest, but the term has been held by
the courts and the Service to mean "the amount which one has
contracted to pay for the use, forbearance, or detention of mon-
ey.' 7 As long as the deduction arises from a genuine indebted-
ness8 and cannot be construed as a repayment of principal instead
of interest,9 the interest deduction will generally be allowed.
Because of the broad scope of the statute10 and because of the
cash basis taxpayer's control over the timing of the deduction
through his choice of the tax year in which he will pay the interest
charge, section 163 presents him with a tempting tax planning
device. If the taxpayer has a year in which his income is unusually
high, he can shelter some of it by electing to prepay interest in that
year." Likewise, prepaid interest may be a useful leverage tool,
allowing the taxpayer to use largely tax deductible dollars to fi-
nance speculative land purchases with little or no downpayment.
1 2
A taxpayer foreseeing the need for a deduction in the year follow-
ing the one in which the interest accrues may wish to delay
payment until that following year. Whatever the tax planning
device consists of, the brevity of section 163(a) and the accompa-
nying regulation 3 seemingly could be construed to authorize its
use by the cash basis taxpayer.
However, again because of the nature of section 163 (a) itself,
the law of prepaid interest depends primarily on the positions taken
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163 (a) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
7. Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932); cf. Deputy v.
Dupont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Rev. Rul. 72-315, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 49.
The Code also provides several limitations on the amount of the inter-
est deduction. See, e.g., CODE § 264 (interest incurred in connection
with life insurance contracts); § 265 (interest arising in connection
with tax-exempt interest income); and § 269 (interest deduction aris-
ing in connection with corporate acquisitions).
8. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
9. Kenneth D. LaCroix, 61 T.C. No. 471 (1974); Norman Titcher, 57 T.C.
No. 315 (1971).
10. For a discussion of the broad scope, see Goldstein v. Commissioner,
364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'g on other grounds, 44 T.C. No. 284,
(1965), vacating 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1651 (1964).
11. Asimow, supra note 3, at 40; Kanter, Interest Deduction: Use, Ruse,
Refuse, 46 TAxEs 794, 798-99 (1968).
12. Asimow, supra note 3, at 41; Kanter, supra note 11, at 813-14; Roulac,
Financing Ideas: The Economics of Prepaid Interest, 2 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 598 (1973). This role for prepaid interest is perhaps the most
popular.
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1 (1960), as amended T.D. 6593, 1962-1 CuM. BULL.
22, T.D. 6821, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 360, T.D. 6873, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 101.
TAXATION
by the courts rather than on the words of the statute. As evi-
denced by the following discussion of the cases, these positions
have been subject to rather abrupt change.
A. Pre-1968
One of the first cases to deal with prepaid interest was R. L.
Blaffer,14 a 1937 memorandum decision by the Board of Tax
Appeals.15 In Blaffer a "cash receipts and disbursement" taxpayer
had deducted from his gross income in 1932 interest amounting to
$18,675 due on March 31, 1933, but which he prepaid on Decem-
ber 31, 1932. The court stated:
Clearly, the item in controversy is in the nature of prepaid ex-
pense, which pertained to the earning of income in 1933, and to
allow it as a deduction in 1932 would distort the income for that
year, whether the taxable income be computed on the basis of cash
receipts and disbursements or by the accrual method.16
The court allowed the Commissioner to use his section 41 authori-
ty 17 to recompute the taxpayer's net income and avoid its distor-
tion.
The Blaffer ruling was changed radically only two years later
when the leading case of John D. Fackler'8 was decided by the
Board of Tax Appeals. The taxpayer in Fackler was allowed to
deduct the 1935 and 1936 interest he prepaid in 1934 because:
... distortion of the petitioner's income would not result here
from the deduction of this prepaid interest payment any more than
it would from the payment of one of the current taxable years for
interest covering an elapsed period of more than those years.19
The court held that imposing the accrual method for a single
accounting item when the taxpayer was on the cash basis method
as to the remaining items was not allowable. It neither explicitly
distinguished nor overruled the Blaffer prepaid expense approach,
14. 6 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 37,297 (1937).
15. Earlier cases than Blaffer dealing with prepayments may be found.
However, in those cases the prepayments were not characterized as
interest, but as capital expenditures. This eliminates these cases from
this note's consideration, because even under the cash basis method
of accounting, capital expenditures must be allocated over the life of
the asset created. See, e.g., Oscar G. Joseph, 32 B.T.A. 1192 (1935);
Julia Stow Lovejoy, 18 B.T.A. 1179 (1930); Evalena M. Howard, 19
B.T.A. 865 (1930); J. Alland & Bros., Inc., 1 B.T.A. 631 (1925).
16. 6 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 1 37-397.
17. INT. RaV. CODE OF 1932, § 41.
18. 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939-1 CUM. BuLL. 11, acquiescence
withdrawn, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 76.
19. Id. at 398.
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but did make a point of the fact that the taxpayer's prepayments
had a valid business purpose since they transformed a demand note
into a time note which could not be called during the time covered
by the prepayment and also secured a reduction in the interest rate
from five per cent to three per cent.
The distortion of income theory and the theory that prepay-
ment created an asset that should have been capitalized, both of
which had been advocated by the Commissioner and followed by
the Blaffer court, were thus apparently disapproved by Fackler.
The court's holding that there was no distortion, at least in compar-
ison to postpaid interest, and that there could be no capitalization
of what was found to be a business expense laid the foundation for
an era in which prepaid interest was an integral part of many tax
shelters.
Despite the holding of the Fackler case and ruling in Court
Holding Company20 in 1943, which again upheld a cash basis
taxpayer's right to deduct a prepayment of interest, the cautious tax
planner at that time would not have been prepared to recommend
prepayment of interest as a tax planning device for large transac-
tions,21 because the major cases dealt only with short prepayment
periods, small amounts, and, at least in Fackler, a business pur-
pose.
But the proverbial dam broke in 1945 with the issuance of
Income Tax Unit Ruling ("I.T.") 374022 which stated:
.. . [W]here a taxpayer keeps books of account and files Fed-
eral income tax returns on the cash receipts and disbursements
basis, interest paid in advance for a period of five years constitutes
an allowable deduction for Federal income tax purposes for the
year in which paid, but where the accrual basis of accounting is
used in reporting income, interest is deductible for the year in
which the liability to pay accrues regardless of when payment is
actually made.
The ruling effectively opened the door for long-term prepaid inter-
est deductions of apparently unlimited amounts. Several cases
upheld the ruling,23 although various methods were used by the
courts to disallow the deduction when the payment had no eco-
nomic reality except to gain a tax benefit.24 These affirmative
20. 2 T.C. No. 531 (1943).
21. Asinow, supra note 3, at 46.
22. I.T. 3740, 1945 Cum. BULL. 109.
23. George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. No. 688 (1968); Clifford F. Hood, 30 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1245 (1961); L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. No. 1 (1960). Cf.
Joseph H. Konigsberg, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 49 (1946).
24. Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (sham transac-
tion); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) (inter-
est has no purpose or substance apart from the tax consequences).
TAXATION
judicial precedents coupled with I.T. 3740 firmly established the
prepaid interest deduction as a tax planning device that was to be
abused by overzealous tax planners. 25 In Kapel Goldstein2 the
court responded to these abuses and tolled the death knell of I.T.
3740 by declaring:
The rule is well established that prepaid interest is deductible
by a cash basis taxpayer in the year payment is made, even though
it covers a period or periods extending beyond the current year of
payment .... The rule appears to be contra where the amount
prepaid is for insurance ... or for rent .... The courts, in the
above cases, have held that where a cash basis taxpayer prepays
rent or insurance, he must prorate deductions with respect to such
prepayment. The rule thus applicable to prepaid rent -and insur-
ance seems to be based on much more persuasive logic than that
with respect to prepaid interest; and if the matter of the year for
a cash basis taxpayer to deduct prepaid interest were before us now
for the first time, we would be disposed to require proration of de-
ductions for prepaid interest over all the periods benefited. How-
ever, the rule allowing full deduction in the year of payment of
prepaid interest having become rather firmly imbedded, we may
assume for present purposes that it will continue to be adhered
to.27
Although the Goldstein memorandum decision was withdrawn
and decided on other grounds, on appeal from the Tax Court's
revised decision, the Second Circuit stated that the interest deduc-
tion was not available unless the transactions had "purpose, sub-
stance or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences."
"Mixed motives" were required.28
Because of cases like Goldstein,29 the usefulness of the prepaid
interest device in tax planning had gradually declined from its I.T.
3740 utility. And it became totally vulnerable with the issuance of
Revenue Ruling 68-643 in 1968.30
B. Revenue Ruling 68-643
Revenue Ruling 68-643, as amplified by Revenue Ruling 69-
582,31 revoked I.T. 3740 after nearly a quarter century of service
25. The famous Livingstone cases, named for the tax planner involved in
the separate cases, illustrate the fatal attractiveness and abuse of I.T.
3740. For a list of the Livingstone cases, see those cited in Brown
v. United States, 396 F.2d 459, 462-63 (Ct. Cl. 1968). See also Rev.
Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 76.
26. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1651 (1964), vacated, 44 T.C. No. 284 (1965),
aff'd on other grounds, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
27. Id. at 1659.
28. Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
29. See, e.g., Barnett v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1966).
30. Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cum. BuLL. 76.
31. Rev. Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 Cum. BULL. 29. Revenue Ruling 69-582 deals
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and also withdrew the acquiescenses in Fackler and Court Holding
Company. Reacting to the abuses that had grown out of I.T. 3740
and with cognizance of the Tax Court's withdrawn decision in
Goldstein, the Service promulgated a new set of rules involving
prepaid interest deductions by adopting the theory that the prepay-
ment could lead to a distortion of income. If this occurred, the
deduction would be disallowed pursuant to the Commissioner's
authority under section 446(b) to change the taxpayer's method of
accounting if such method does not clearly reflect income. Pre-
payment of interest for a period beyond the end of the taxable year
succeeding the year of prepayment would be automatically disal-
lowed as a distortion of income.3 2 In situations where the twelve
month rule was not violated, the Service concluded that the distor-
tion of income issue had to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis,
stating:
Some of the factors to be considered in determining whether the
deduction of prepaid interest gives rise to a material distortion of
income include but are not limited to the amount of income in the
taxable year of payment, the income of previous taxable years, the
amount of prepaid interest, the time of payment, the reason for pre-
payment, and the existence of a varying rate of interest over the
term of the loan.33
With the state of the prepaid interest art thus having made a
180 degree turn from Fackler and I.T. 3740, two issues arose in
subsequent challenges to Revenue Ruling 68-643: 1) whether the
Commissioner had the authority to exercise the discretion given
him in Revenue Ruling 68-643; and 2) what standards were to be
used to determine when a material distortion of income existed.
The most striking facet of the post-1968 cases which dealt with
these questions was the distinct absence of judicial reliance on the
revenue ruling in spite of possible congressional sanction of it, as
indicated by a House Ways and Means Committee statement.
Your committee's attention was also called to the matter of de-
ductions for prepaid interest. On November 26, 1968, the Internal
Revenue Service issued a ruling which held that any prepayment
for prepaid interest which would materially distort income ...
should be allowed only on the accrual basis. This ruling is in ac-
cord with the treatment given other prepayments of expenses and
with situations in which borrowers are charged "loan processing fees"
or "points" as compensation to the lender for placing the loan. The
ruling expanded somewhat upon Revenue Ruling 68-643 by holding
that points that were determined to be interest under Rev. Rul. 69-
188, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 54, would not be considered as a distortion of
income under Revenue Ruling 68-643.
32. Commonly known as the "12-month rule."
33. Rev. Rul. 63-643, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 76.
TAXATION
is in accord with your Committee's concept of the law. Thus, it
does not seem necessary to include a provision in the bill to deal
with this problem.34
However, since such a committee statement does not have the force
of law, the courts have apparently felt free to interpret and test3 5
Revenue Ruling 68-643 until Congress' position is more clearly
delineated by further legislative action.36
C. Post-1968
The first post-1968 cases dealing with prepaid interest deduc-
tions involved facts that led the courts to conclude, as they had in
many pre-1968 cases, 37 that the interest transaction was either a
sham38 or actually a downpayment on the property.39 Because of
this, the holdings did not rely upon Revenue Ruling 68-643 or
upon a determination that a material distortion of income
("MDOI") existed. In light of this, the cases added nothing of
interest to the Revenue Ruling 68-643 theory of prepaid interest,
although several indicated that had the deduction been allowed,
there may have been MDOI.40 Consequently, the Tax Court's first
review of the area of prepaid interest under the theory of Revenue
Ruling 68-643 which occurred in Andrew A. Sandor41 was viewed
with great interest.
In Sandor, the facts showed that a cash basis taxpayer, interest-
ed in securities investments, in 1968 had prepaid $38,041 of
interest payments that would have accrued over the life of a five
year, seven and a half per cent note. The taxpayer missed being
covered by I.T. 3740 in 1968,42 but decided to make the prepay-
34. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969). See
also G. Douglas Burck, 63 T.C. No. 556 (1975).
35. Revenue rulings may be used as precedent in tax cases, but are not
binding on the courts. Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates, Inc. v. United
States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hall, 398 F.2d
383 (8th Cir. 1968).
36. For proposed legislation, see the Tax Equity Act of 1975, H.R. 1040,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), which would allow the deduction of inter-
est only as it accrued for the cash basis taxpayer.
37. See note 24 supra.
38. Estate of Martin Melcher, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1010 (1970).
39. 61 T.C. No. 471 (1974); 57 T.C. No. 315 (1971).
40. Id. See also 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1010 (1970).
41. 62 T.C. No. 469 (1974).
42. Id. at 472. Evidently the taxpayer paid the interest on December 31,
1968. Revenue Ruling 68-643 allowed payments for prepaid interest
made before November 26, 1968 to be covered by I.T. 3740, as Revenue
Ruling 68-643 would not apply retroactively under authority granted
by CoDE § 7805 (b).
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ment under Revenue Ruling 68-643 regardless. The provisions of
the loan were such that if it had been paid early, the taxpayer
would have received a refund of the unearned portion of the
prepaid interest, less a minimum charge of ninety days' interest as a
penalty for early payment.
43
The Commissioner used Revenue Ruling 68-643 and his au-
thority under section 446 to challenge the 1968 interest deduction,
arguing that the deduction would materially distort taxable income
for 1968. He advocated that the taxpayer allocate the interest over
the five year period and deduct in 1968 only the amount of interest
allocable to 1968. 4 4  The taxpayer responded by contending that
his deduction did not materially distort 1968 taxable income, and
that Revenue Ruling 68-643 was not a proper exercise of the
rulemaking authority of the Commissioner.4 5 The court, after
reviewing the background and history of section 446, upheld the
Commissioner's theory.
The Sandor case was significant since it affirmed the right of
the Service to test the deductibility of prepaid interest against the
standard of material distortion of income. It is also notable for
advancing a deposit theory, which in effect required the interest
deduction to be capitalized over the life of the loan.40  It is
important to note, however, that despite the use of the revenue
ruling, the Sandor court did not endorse Revenue Ruling 68-643
without qualification.
While we have indicated that respondent's Rev. Rul. 68-643
would not be an abuse of his authority if applied in this case, we
do not intend to place a stamp of approval on everything said in
the ruling or on the application of that ruling to all cases.
We agree that the allowance of a deduction of 5 years of prepaid
interest in this case would distort income, but we are not prepared
to say that a deduction of any prepaid interest extending beyond
a period of 12 months following the year of payment would distort
income under all circumstances and justify changing a taxpayer's
method of accounting with respect to the prepaid interest items
43. Id.
44. Id. at 473.
45. Id. at 470.
46. The court made this statement on the basis of comparisons with pre-
paid feed cases such as Tim W. Lillie, 45 T.C. No. 54 (1965) and Shippy
v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D. 1961), aff'd, 308 F.2d 743
(8th Cir. 1962). Cf. John Ernst, 32 T.C. No. 181 (1959); Rev. Rul. 75-
152, 1975-1 CuM. BULL. 144, at 15. Note that the deposit theory was
not the basis of the decision, but' a supporting argument to but-
tress the material distortion of income conclusion. 62 T.C. at 482. See
also Willingham & Kasmir, Prepaid Feed Deduction: How to Cope
with IRS' Restrictive New Ruling, 43 J. TAx. 230 (Oct. 1975).
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.... We believe the Revenue Service may be called upon to sup-
port its determinations in some such cases.47
Sandor then specifically rejected the use of Fackler and Court
Holding Company as a basis for the proposition that Revenue
Ruling 68-643 was an abuse of discretion by the Service. The
court advocated instead a case-by-case analysis to establish whether
or not MDOI existed. If MDOI were not found, then an abuse of
discretion a fortiori existed, regardless of the period covered by the
prepaid interest.
Furthermore, the court refused to use the standards for deter-
mining the existence of MDOI which were advocated in Revenue
Ruling 68-643 and instead made its own determination that a
material distortion had occurred. Although using a checklist of
reasons, the one fact apparently leading to the court's determina-
tion that MDOI existed was that the only reason the taxpayer
agreed to prepay the five years' interest was to use the deduction to
reduce his taxable income and consequently his tax liability. Any
further reason behind the court's finding of MDOI was hidden in
the simple assertion that "[W] e agree with respondent that the
deduction of 5 years of prepaid interest by petitioners in 1968
would distort their income."48  Setting more certain rules, the
court felt, would "be ruling in advance without any knowledge of
the facts and circumstances." 49
G. Douglas Burck50 followed the Sandor decision in the pre-
paid interest chronology of cases. In Burck, the Tax Court disal-
lowed the deduction of one year's prepaid interest by a cash basis
taxpayer on the ground that it led to a material distortion of the
taxpayer's taxable income. The case, following the tests as set
forth in Sandor and Revenue Ruling 68-643, further restricted the
possible use of prepaid interest deductions and raised the question
of when, if ever, prepaid interest could be deducted.
The Burck facts are similar to those of Sandor. The taxpayer,
through a seven per cent secured promissory term note, borrowed
$3,000,000 from a Michigan banking corporation for certain in-
vestments. The facts do not indicate whether any of the $377,202
prepayment of interest on the first year's interest charges made on
December 30, 1969 were refundable. It is also unknown whether
there was a penalty if the note were paid early. The use of the
47. 62 T.C. at 481-82.
48. Id. at 481.
49. Id. at 482.
50. 63 T.C. No. 556 (1975).
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deduction reduced the taxpayer's taxable income from $418,585 to
$41,383 for 1969. 51
The court held that the Commissioner had the power to force
the taxpayer to use the accrual method of accounting for the
prepaid interest without having to use it for any other financial
items.52 Section 446 was held to give the Commissioner broad
powers to adjust accounting methods to reflect income clearly,
including the treatment of any individual item. Revenue Ruling
68-643 was also cited, and although the Burck court held that the
ruling was not binding, they proceeded to use five of the six factors
mentioned in it as a checklist in determining when MDOI existed.
The court concluded:
After reviewing all of the facts and circumstances of the mat-
ter at hand we hold that a deduction for -the prepayment of interest
would result in a distortion of the taxable income for the year of
payment. We make this determination by noting, inter alia, the
following: In 1969 petitioner realized a long-term capital gain in
the amount of $968,186.00, an amount far in excess of the gross in-
come of petitioner in the two prior years; the prepayment of inter-
est in the amount of $377,202.00 on December 30, 1969 based on
loans to petitioner one day earlier in the amount of $5,388,600.00;
and, in addition, petitioner has conceded that one of his motivations
in borrowing the funds was the interest deduction he would receive
by the prepayment of interest.53
Despite this listing of factors, the lack of analysis by the Burck
court made interpretation, application, and prediction in other fact
situations difficult. In addition, as noted in at least one article,54
the ambiguities of the decision which are evident upon close analy-
sis made it difficult after Burck for the tax planner to recommend
the use of interest prepayments in substantial amounts, especially if
the taxpayer were aware of the possible tax ramifications of the
transaction before he made it.
The final case to be noted is James V. Cole,55 which involved
cash basis taxpayers who had prepaid forty months' interest on a
trust deed note financing newly purchased apartments. The tax-
payers argued first, and unsuccessfully, that their legal obligation
51. Id. at 309. The taxable income before the deduction is recomputed
by adding back the interest prepayment to the taxpayer's reported
taxable income: $41,383 plus $377,202 equals $418,585, less the 3/365
x the $377,202 actually allowed, so that recomputed 1969 taxable in-
come equals $415,485.
52. Id. at 310.
53. Id. at 311.
54. Zarrow & Gordon, Tax Court's Burck Decision: Where Does it Leave
Us on the Issue of Prepaid Interest?, 42 J. TAx. 326 (June 1975).
55. 64 T.C. No. 1091 (1975).
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on the note arose on November 25, 1968, thus allowing the
favorable provisions of I.T. 3740 to cover their transaction instead
of Revenue Ruling 68-643. The court found no legal obligation
as of November 26, 1968, however, and consequently held the
taxpayers subject to Revenue Ruling 68-643. 56
The major issue in Cole arose from the head-on collision
between the taxpayers' assertion that no MDOI had occurred from
the prepayment deduction and the Commissioner's argument that it
was MDOI and as such created a valuable asset that must be
prorated over the term of the loan. The court, after retracing the
history of prepaid interest from Fackler to Sandor, reasserted the
holding that the Commissioner had broad discretion under section
446 to determine what method of accounting clearly reflected
income5 7 and that the taxpayer had a heavy burden in overcoming
that determination.5 8  The court also reaffirmed its decision in
Sandor not to "place its stamp of approval on everything said" in
Revenue Ruling 68-643.59
The Cole court found that in this fact situation MDOI did
exist. It noted that the transaction had a significant impact on the
overall income picture,60 that the case was similar to Sandor in
that the taxpayer "sought out a transaction which would produce an
56. Id. at 1100. The taxpayers also advanced an equitable estoppel argu-
ment that Revenue Ruling 68-643 as applied to them was retroactive
and so grossly unfair as to estop the Commissioner from denying the
deduction. The court held that the ruling was not being applied retro-
actively, and even if it were, the Commissioner could retroactively cor-
rect mistakes of law even where the taxpayer had relied to his detri-
ment on the Commissioner's mistake. See, e.g., Automobile Club of
Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Manhattan Gen. Equip.
Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
57. See also Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959); Fort Howard
Paper Co., 49 T.C. No. 275 (1967).
58. See also 49 T.C. No. 275 (1967); Photosonics, Inc., 42 T.C. No. 926
(1964).
59. 64 T.C. at 1103-06.
60. The court stated:
There is no question that petitioner's income picture was
materially affected by the large interest deductions in 1968.
The deduction of $58,947.60 by James and Esther Cole and of$39,292.50 by Clifford and Elizabeth Cole represented interest
prepaid for a period of forty months. Although only eight
days out of the entire 1223 day period (40 months) for which
interest was prepaid fell within 1968, all of the interest
attributable to this period was deducted in 1968. We believe
that at least under the circumstances herein, this is enough
to demonstrate that petitioners' accounting of the prepaid
interest here involved does not clearly reflect income.
Id. at 611.
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unusually large deduction in a high income year,"6 that the lack
of refundability of the interest upon early payment of the principle
had no effect on whether MDOI existed or not, and that the distor-
tion was beyond that which "might normally be expected in the
commercial world, even under the cash method . . . absent the
utilization of a particular tax consequence as a central feature of
the transaction. '6 2 The combination of these factors, when com-
pared to the court's checklist, led it to hold that MDOI did exist in
Cole.
Ill. S. REX LEWIS: THE FACTS AND THE
TAX COURT'S DECISION
S. Rex Lewis involved a partnership called Howard and Lewis
Investments ("HLI"), formed by the petitioner and his law part-
ner, Jackson B. Howard, 63 to invest in real estate. After a series of
negotiations that culminated in a three-party real estate exchange,
HLI and another company known as Anchorage Development
Company planned to build and operate as a partnership a 118-unit
apartment complex on land located in Ventura County, California.
HLI and Anchorage each had a fifty per cent interest in the
investment, with Anchorage to receive four per cent of the gross
rentals for its services in managing the project.6 4
To finance the construction of the complex, Anchorage and
HLI applied for and received a $900,000 loan from the Trans-
Coast Savings and Loan Association of Oxnard, California. The
note, signed on December 28, 1970, provided for interest to be
payable at the rate of nine per cent per annum, with the interest
through June 15, 1971 to be paid only on the amounts actually
disbursed during construction. After June 15, 1971, interest was
to be payable on the full amount of the loan. In all, $48,228.75 in
interest became payable in 1971 under this agreement.6 5 As of
January 15, 1972, monthly payments of $7,553 were to be made
until principal and interest were paid in full.
The borrowers had the right of prepayment on any of the loan
installments.6 6 The Savings and Loan, however, was entitled to a
prepayment penalty of 180 days' interest on the original principal
if the aggregate amount of all prepayments in any successive twelve
61. Id.
62. Id. n.5.
63. 65 T.C. 625 (1976).
64. Id. at 628.
65. Id. at 627.
66. Id.
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month period plus regular installment payments equalled or ex-
ceeded twenty per cent of the principal.8 7
Anchorage and ELI had agreed that HLI would be responsible
for the first $80,000 of interest on the loan. S. Rex Lewis and his
partner, Howard, each having individually borrowed $40,000, paid
$18,000 apiece for four "points"68 charged by the lenders as a
prerequisite to making the loan, and the remainder ($22,000
apiece) in a voluntary prepayment of interest due on the loan for
1972. All of the payments were made on December 28, 1971.
The following represent the partnership and the petitioner's
individual tax returns for 1968-1970:69
Partnership Returns: 1968 1969 1970
Loss Reported $ 7,085.63 $ 1,974.17 $81,549.95
Petitioner's distributive share - 3,542.82 987.09 40,774.97
Interest Deduction 80, 00
*Equals the $36,000 point charge and the $44,000 interest payments.
Lewis' Returns:
Taxable Income 22,123.16 39,589.04 2,710.85
The Tax Court's decision was divided into three parts: 1) the
loan fee (points); 2) the prepaid interest; and 3) the allocation
between HLI and Anchorage of the interest deduction.
The first issue, involving the deductibility of the $36,000 loan
fee, arose from a conflict between the taxpayer and Commissioner
over allocation of the payment of the fee over the term of the loan.
The parties agreed that the points were interest under section
163(a) and that the payment was made in 1970, the year in
question. However, the taxpayer argued that a cash basis taxpayer
is entitled to deduct an interest payment in the year in which it is
made, especially where the fee is not refundable.
The Commissioner contended that the fee was amortizable,
relying on the decision in Anover Realty Corp.,70 which held that
costs incurred in procuring a loan must be amortized over its term.
The court disagreed with this argument, however, stating:
Interest paid in the form of a loan fee was not, however, at issue
in that [the Anover] controversy; and there is more recent author-
ity to the effect that such an item need not necessarily be amor-
tized. See James v. Cole, 64 T.C. No. 105 (1975) 71
67. Id. at 355.
68. For purposes of this note, "points" are the fees paid by the borrower
to the lender as an additional charge for the use of money. Rev. Rul.
69-188, 1969-1 Cum. BuLL. 54. One point is equal to one per cent of
the amount borrowed.
69. 65 T.C. at 628.
70. 33 T.C. No. 671 (1960).
71. 65 T.C. at 629.
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Despite this, the Lewis court was not quite ready to let go of
the issue, stating that even though Anover was not applicable, the
fees may still be allocable over the term of the loan if to deduct
such an item in the year of payment would result in MDOI. Citing
Burck and Sandor, the court said that if MDOI was found, the
Commissioner would rely on section 446(b) and require that the
taxpayer's accounting of the term be changed so that it would more
clearly reflect income.72
The court rejected the idea of MDOI existing in reference to
the "points," however, giving the following definition of when
MDOI exists:
Existing authority does not define precisely what constitutes a
material distortion of income; but such a distortion is likely to be
found when the amount of an interest expense item is substantially
in excess of what might normally be expected in an arm's-length
transaction structured without special regard to tax consequences.73
Since points are commonly required as a precondition in making a
loan, and since the taxpayers were dealing with the lender at
"arms-length," the court held that no MDOI would result if the
$36,000 was deducted in 1970. 74
The second issue in S. Rex Lewis, the question of the prepaid
interest deduction, was treated in more detail than the first. Its
resolution depended upon the determination of several factors. The
court examined whether the $44,000 payment was actually "inter-
est" under section 163. Basing its decision largely on its holdings
in General American Life Insurance Co. 75 and R.D. Cravens76
(despite a reversal by the Tenth Circuit) the Tax Court held that
the payment was interest to the extent of the penalty which would
have been imposed if the entire loan had been paid early, as
specified by the terms of the obligation. 77 The reasoning was that
any amount that could possibly be refunded was not interest under
section 163. It was a deposit which could not be deducted in the
year paid but must be allocated over the term of the loan, accord-
ing to Cravens. Since the early payment penalty in S. Rex Lewis
would have equaled $40,500,78 $3,500 of the $44,000 prepayment
was thus a deposit, and $40,500 was held to be interest.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 629.
74. Id. at 630.
75. 25 T.C. No. 1265 (1956).
76. 30 T.C. No. 903 (1958), rev'd 272F.2d 895 (1959).
77. 65 T.C. at 630.
78. This is computed from the face amount of the loan: $900,000 X
180/360 X 9%. In 1970, a 360 day year was commonly used for com-
puting interest.
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The Tax Court, however, did not hold the $40,500 entirely
deductible in the year of prepayment simply because it was interest
under section 163, even though ordinarily a cash basis taxpayer
could take the deduction. It agreed with the Commissioner's
argument that if the interest prepayment resulted in MDOI in the
year of payment, it should be allocated over the loan tife.79
The Service then contended, on the basis of Revenue Ruling
68-643, that because in S. Rex Lewis the prepayment related to a
period exceeding twelve months, the prepayment automatically
constituted MDOI. The court disagreed with the Service's twelve-
month rule, however, holding that while the period to which the
prepayment relates is a factor of considerable weight, "it is by no
means dispositive of the issue."' 0
The item now under consideration can in no event exceed the
interest which would become payable on the construction loan in
a period of approximately one-half year's duration. Respondent
nevertheless contends that a material distortion may result from
the cumulation of that item and the loan fee. We disagree; for
stated interest relating to a period of one year or less and a loan
fee might typically be paid in a single year in a transaction struc-
tured without regard to tax consequences.8 1
Thus the Tax Court again found no MDOI to exist due to the
"lack of regard for tax consequences" and held $40,500 of the
$44,000 prepayment deductible in 1970, the year of payment.8 2
The final issue the court faced was whether HLI would be
allowed to deduct the interest prepayment in whole, or whether,
because of the partnership with Anchorage, it would be forced to
deduct only fifty per cent of the entire partnership income and
losses. The Commissioner argued, of course, that since HLI was a
partner whose distributive share of income and losses was fifty per
cent, HLI should be entitled to deduct only one-half of the deducti-
ble interest prepayments.
The Tax Court rejected the Service's position, referring to an
economic burden exception to the general rule that a partner's
distributive share of a partnership deduction is determined by his
distributive share of income or loss.8 3 The court found that be-
cause of the special agreement between ELI and Anchorage, HLI
had borne the entire economic burden of the interest prepayment
and as such should be allowed the entire deduction.
79. 65 T.C. at 631.
80. Id. at 632.
81. Id. at 631-32.
82. Id. at 632.
83. Id.
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A particular deduction may, however, be specially allocated to
the partner who bears the economic 'burden of the expenditure un-
derlying the deduction. See Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970),
aff'd. per curiam (9th Cir. 1973).84
IV. THE NEW APPROACH AND ITS EFFECT
A. The Change in Approach
As stated earlier,", the major battles in the prepaid interest
deduction field have been fought over two issues: 1) whether the
Commissioner had the authority to exercise the discretion given
him in Revenue Ruling 68-643; and 2) the standards by which to
determine whether MDOI exists in given fact situations. The
Lewis court apparently accepted without question the Sandor and
Burck rulings on the authority question, 8 allowing the Commis-
sioner the power to reallocate the interest deduction over the
applicable time period if in the year of payment it did not "clearly
reflect income" or, in other words, was MDOI.8 7 Consequently,
the Lewis decision focuses on the second major issue, i.e., deciding
when MDOI exists.
S. Rex Lewis is significant because of its change in approach to
the MDOI problem. The definition of MDOI as a distortion
"likely to be found when the amount of an interest expense is
substantially in excess of what might normally be expected in an
arm's-length transaction structured without regard to the tax conse-
quences,"' 8 while perhaps not of the magnitude of the change of
I.T. 3740 or Revenue Ruling 68-643,89 is a change nevertheless
from the approach and standards used since 1968 in this area. The
refusal of the Lewis court to follow either the Service's twelve-
month rule or the post-Revenue Ruling 68-643 cases' "checklist of
factors" approach may indicate that a limitation has finally been
placed on the MDOI doctrine.
Lewis' "drawing of the line" becomes evident when the case is
compared with the major decisions in this area since Revenue
Ruling 68-643. When they are taken as a whole, the impression is
left that it would be rare, if ever, that a prepaid interest deduction
would be found not to constitute MDOI unless its prepayment
period were less than one year in length. The cases run the gamut
from a five year prepayment in Sandor9" to a forty month prepay-
84. Id. at 632-33.
85. See discussion at p. 496 infra.
86. CODE § 446(b).
87. 65 T.C. at 629.
88. Id.
89. See pp. 494-97 infra for discussion.
90. 62 T.C. at 472.
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ment in Cole9 ' to a one year prepayment in Burck;92 but in all
instances IDOI was held to exist. This case trend, coupled with
the automatic twelve month IMOI presumption of Revenue Rul-
ing 68-643, would lead to the conclusion that in order to qualify
for the deduction the interest prepayment should be less than a one
year time period. Even then, MDOI might still be found if the
right facts were present.9 3
Consequently, when the Lewis situation confronted the Tax
Court, it should have had little problem in using post-1968 prece-
dent to come to a decision. Not only did Lewis involve a one year
prepayment, as did Burck, raising the almost irrebuttable presump-
tion that MDOI existed, but Lewis also contained several of the
elements used in the "checklist of factors" approach the court had
employed in finding MDOI in earlier cases. 94 For example, both
Burck and Cole found it notable that the taxpayers had significant-
ly "shielded" current income with the prepaid interest deduction.
The Lewis situation arguably did the same thing since the deduc-
tion in Lewis reduced the taxpayer's taxable income from $22,960
to $2,710. 5 Cole, Burck, and Sandor, using another checklist
factor, found that the transaction's design to avoid taxes was
significant in finding MDOI.9 6 While the Lewis court claimed
that the taxpayer's prepayment gave him no advantage and that the
transaction was similar to one structured without regard for the tax
consequences, 97 it could just as easily have found that the transac-
tion was partly planned to avoid taxes.98  The agreement with
91. 64 T.C. at 1099.
92. 63 T.C. at 558.
93. Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 76.
94. For a listing of factors, see, e.g., Rev. RuL 68-643, 1968-2 CUM. BULL.
76; 62 T.C. at 472; 64 T.C. at 1102, n.5; 63 T.C. at 560. While the cases
rather uniformly disaffirm absolute reliance on the expressed list of
factors in Revenue Ruling 68-643, the relevant factors in the decisions
were similar.
95. Mr. Lewis's "pre-deduction income" would have equaled his reported
1970 income plus his share of the deduction, i.e., $2,710 plus $40,500/2,
which equals $22,960. This tax avoidance or shielding is shown even
more dramatically in Mr. Lewis's law partner's situation in the twin
case to Lewis, Jackson B. Howard, P-H TAx CT. MEM. 76,005 (1976).
In Howard, the taxpayer's taxable income because of the prepaid in-
terest deduction went from $46,293 to $26,043.
96. 64 T.C. at 1105; 63 T.C. at 561; 62 T.C. at 481.
97. 65 T.C. at 631.
98. For a similar case in which the Tax Court did find that the taxpayer
was aware of the tax consequences despite his claims of ignorance,
see Anderson, TCM 1975-302, CCH Dec. No. 33,447 (M). Anderson in-
volved a fact situation similar to that in Lewis. A taxpayer argued
he was unaware of the tax impact of his prepaid interest deduction
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Anchorage to allow HLI to deduct all of the first year's interest
charges instead of prorating them between the partners seems to
point toward this inference.9 9 The payment of the interest on
December 30 would also appear to indicate a tax consequence
awareness.
The point that should be emphasized is that the above compari-
sons of Lewis to the pre-Lewis cases do not indicate the court's
lack of precedent awareness, but reflect the court's change in
treatment of the prepaid interest deduction. The move from the
checklist of factors standard to a test where such factors are
considered, 0 0 but the major consideration is the deposit distortion
and the similarity of the transaction to other commercial arm's-
length transactions, is one of significance, as it is a change from the
previous rationale relied on in this area.
B. The Effect of the Change
Despite the change in approach to the prepaid interest deduc-
tion, the Lewis decision does little in clearing the controversy over
the standards by which to determine if MDOI exists. It is difficult
to predict with any degree of certainty that the interest expense in
any situation is "normal," is part of an arm's-length transaction,
and is structured without regard for tax consequences. This last
portion of the rule is especially difficult to comply with since the
basic reason for prepaying interest is to gain a tax advantage to
compensate for the loss of the use of the money. Without special
considerations for the payment, there is little reason to give money
to the lender before the debt is due. In a case like Lewis where it
was asserted that there was no non-tax advantage to be gained by
the prepayment,' 0 ' the conclusion would be that the prepayment
decision had to be influenced by tax considerations.
However, there is a facet to Lewis that may clear the muddle.
The facts state that a penalty which was relatively large in compari-
son to the amount of prepaid interest would have been imposed
upon the borrower if he had paid the loan principal before the
contract due date.10 2 The major cases since 1968 did not involve
transaction, but the Tax Court shrugged off this argument in quick
fashion. CCH p. 1326 n.11.
99. 65 T.C. at 627.
100. The Lewis court considered the similarity of the transaction to other
non-tax commercial operations, the loan not being made for tax pur-
poses, the short prepayment period, and the lack of advantages gained
from the prepayment.
101. 65 T.C. at 627.
102. Id.
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such a situation. While Sandor did have a refundable interest
situation with penalty, the penalty involved was relatively insignifi-
cant when compared to the total interest charges.103 Cole did not
allow interest refunds or penalty,10 4 and even noted that refunda-
bility had no effect on the determination of whether MDOI exist-
ed.' 05 In Burck the facts do not disclose whether interest refunds
and early payment penalties were available. The significance of
this is that in Lewis the amount that could have been refunded was
held to be a deposit, 06 and as such had to be deducted in alloca-
tions over the years to which it was applicable. Since the possible
refund was so small (8 per cent) compared to the possible penalty
(ninety-two per cent) ,17 therefore causing the "deposit distortion"
to be correspondingly small, the court could be saying that the
effect of the transaction was one of minor, if any, distortion. This
comparison is borne out when Sandor is examined. In Sandor the
possible refund was ninety-five per cent of the total interest
charges, a figure relatively large when compared to the possible
penalty of only five per cent.'08 Thus it involved almost the exact
opposite situation of Lewis, since its deposit distortion was much
greater than that in Lewis. Thus Sandor should have had a
correspondingly greater chance of having 1DOI present than in
Lewis, and this is borne out by the respective decisions.
The deposit distortion test for 1DOI, while new to the prepaid
interest field, has been used in comparable fashion in cases involv-
ing farmer's prepaid feed expenses. In Mann v. Commissioner'00
the Service argued successfully that the taxpayer could take no
current deduction for prepaid feed expenses so long as the payment
might be recovered, i.e., so long as there were a large deposit
distortion. Similarly, Shippy v. United States"0' held that a re-
fundable deposit was not an ordinary and necessary business ex-
103. 62 T.C. at 472. In Sandor, a minimum penalty equal to 90 days' inter-
est at seven and one-half percent on $100,000 would have been im-
posed if the loan had been paid early. Thus, the penalty equaled$100,000 x 7%% x 90/360, which equaled $1875. Compared to the
total interest prepaid on the loan of $38,041, the penalty was five per-
cent of the total interest.
104. 64 T.C. at 1105.
105. Id.
106. 65 T.C. at 630.
107. The penalty in Lewis was 180 days' interest on $900,000 at nine per-
cent. This equals $40,500, see note 94 supra. Compared to the total
interest prepaid on the loan of $44,000, (excluding the points), the
penalty was ninety-two percent of the total interest, and the refund
eight percent.
108. See note 95 supra.
109. 483 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1973).
110. 308 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1962).
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pense and disallowed a current deduction of the prepayment in its
entirety. Revenue Ruling 75-152' 1 1 agrees with the above, indi-
cating that a refundable portion is a deposit and as such is nonde-
ductible in the year of payment. Consequently, it appears that a
comparison of deposit to non-deposit payments for discovery of
MDOI has support from other tax areas.
For these reasons, it might be suggested that tax planners who
intend to use a prepaid interest deduction device should require
large penalty provisions upon their client's early payment of the
loan so as to avoid MDOI. However, the practicalities of such an
arrangement may preclude the tax planner from doing this, since
the taxpayer may desire the early payment provisions for a number
of reasons, the most obvious of which may be to avoid the financial
loss of a large penalty in order to retain the flexibility of the right
to early payment of the loan. In addition, the Service could
characterize the entire arrangement as a sham and thus destroy its
usefulness.
V. CONCLUSION
The Lewis case, despite its change of approach from the major
cases since 1968 in the prepaid interest deduction area, still does
not particularly aid the tax planner in predicting future occurrences
of MDOI. Since Lewis is the only taxpayer's victory in a series of
cases won by the Commissioner, it should not be taken as a basis
for re-establishing the utility of prepaid interest deductions in tax
planning until further decisions are made or until much needed
legislative clarification is obtained. The final conclusion as to
whether or not Lewis is an unusual winning situation for the
taxpayer may then be better decided.
Ronald C. Jensen '77
111. Rev. RuL 75-152, 1975 INT. REV. BULL. No. 12, at 15. For a discussion
of this ruling, see Ward, Tax Postponement and the Cash Method
Farmer: An Analysis of Revenue Ruling 75-152, 53 TExAs L. REv. 1119
(1975).
